The concept of personhood

The abortion debate currently taking place through letters in The Times sheds light on the relative argument in favour of non-human animal personhood and animal rights. This is what should clearly follow from Mark Azzopardi's definition of personhood in his letter in today's The Times which he entitles "Concept of personhood" (which I reproduce below in its entirety).

Mr Azzopardi correctly links the idea of human rights to the concept of personhood. I deem it appropriate to point out that to follow Mr Azzopardi's good logic in the case of personhood would naturally suggest that personhood cannot non-arbitrarily be denied to sentient non-human animals. Please keep this in mind while following Mr Azzopardi's reasoning and arguments.

Mr Azzopardi writes:

"Jacqueline Calleja (The Times, February 7) gives me credit for the concept of personhood, based on the possession of mental faculties, although she is undoubtedly aware that this is the view of most modern secular bioethicists.

In modern rights-based societies, from the moment of birth and throughout life, the question of personhood does not arise and all human beings are considered legal and moral persons with legal and moral rights, until death. Whether they are children with a low IQ or adults with senile dementia, no reason to question their status exists and society makes no distinction between one citizen and another.

Even a neonate, who does not yet have self-awareness and, as a result, interests, has its rights held in trust for it by society and, should its parents not wish to look after it, other adults willing to fill their shoes could easily be located. The same applies to babies who survive premature birth or intentional abortion.

Patients in a persistent vegetative state present an ethical minefield, as there are those who believe that these patients should be allowed to die and others who hold that they should be kept alive at all costs. Several court cases involving such patients have cited considerations such as the quality of life, the wishes of family members, the use of hospital resources and professional responsibilities to reach a decision.

The case of the unborn child is markedly different. In this situation, the viability of the foetus is directly dependent on the pregnant woman, not on society. Although this presents no problem should the woman wish to take her pregnancy to completion, it becomes the subject of ethical consideration if the pregnancy is unwanted.

In this scenario, many bioethicists believe that the moral rights of the foetus, which on the basis of its mental development has not attained the status of personhood, are overridden by the full moral rights of the woman. It is only with the wiring up of the cerebral cortex, which occurs between the 25th and 32nd week of gestation, that the foetus develops sentience and consciousness, thereby achieving the status of personhood.

In the US today, 98 per cent of abortions occur within the first 15 weeks of gestation and 99.9 per cent within the first 27 weeks. Third trimester abortions are rare and sought only because of a physical threat to the woman or gross abnormality of the foetus. In my opinion, abortion of the foetus for gross abnormality is only ethically justifiable in situations which are incompatible with life, such as anencephaly, or others with a low rate of survival and an extremely poor quality of life, such as trisomy 18, which has a 10 per cent first year survival rate and trisomy 13, which has a 28 per cent rate. Both conditions are accompanied by severe retardation, limb and organ deformities and a general inability to see, hear or smell.

On the other hand, spina bifida and Down's syndrome are both compatible with life and sufferers of these conditions may lead perfectly happy lives, once the appropriate surgical interventions have been undertaken.

Ms Calleja is entitled to her opinion and that of the contemporary Catholic Church that personhood occurs at conception. But she must concede that opinions vary. If she were Jewish, she would believe that life began at birth or, if she were a traditional Muslim, she would believe that ensoulment occurred at 120 days of gestation. Perhaps, had she lived in the 13th century, she would have agreed with Popes Innocent III and Gregory IX, that abortion is homicide only when the foetus is 'formed'".

Without going into the merits of whether abortion is ever justifiable, or into which cases might justify abortion or not (I leave that conclusion to the reader's own consideration of whether Mr Azzopardi has argued his case convinvingly), some things naturally flow from Mr Azzopardi's claims with regards to personhood, irrespective of whether personhood is a relevant criteria for justifying or condemning abortion. In any case, the argument for human personhood as a sufficient criteria for recognizing rights does not necessarily close the possibility that other criteria may also be relevant for granting any non-sentients rights as well, provided that these other criteria are both valid and do not deny sentients their rights.

Mr Azzopardi says that "in modern rights-based societies, from the moment of birth and throughout life, the question of personhood does not arise and all human beings are considered legal and moral persons with legal and moral rights, until death. Whether they are children with a low IQ or adults with senile dementia, no reason to question their status exists and society makes no distinction between one citizen and another.

Even a neonate, who does not yet have self-awareness and, as a result, interests, has its rights held in trust for it by society and, should its parents not wish to look after it, other adults willing to fill their shoes could easily be located. The same applies to babies who survive premature birth or intentional abortion".

Now, if personhood is to be taken for-granted for all human animals irrespective of low IQ, senile dementia, etc, does this not strongly suggest that all sentient non-human animals should be equally regarded as persons irrespective of levels of mental faculty?

If sentience is sufficient for acknowledging the moral rights of humans (irrespective of levels in mental cognisance) and consequently protecting them with legal rights, what is it that justifies treating sentient non-human animals any differently? Only speciesist discrimination, the sort of which would justify racism, sexism and all other sorts of prejudiced discrimination, would deny non-human animals rights simply because they are not human. For, if sentience is all that matters in recognizing humans as persons (not to be confused with people), shouldn't the same measure be applied with respect to non-humans?

And no (just in case anyone reduces the argument to the following absurd conclusion), by claiming that we should accord and acknowledge non-human animal rights because non-human animals are sentient too, we do not mean giving non-humans the right to vote, or the right to drive, just as we equally don't give human children the right to vote, or blind humans the right to drive.

By claiming that all sentients have rights, the only rights we would be claiming on behalf of the rights-holding animals are rights that matter to them, and that do not infringe the equal or more fundamental rights of others.

Therefore, by according the right to life and freedom from human exploitation to non-humans (as we do to human persons), we are recognizing rights that matter to them. Similarly, by denying them "rights" which do not matter to them or actually harm others, we would actually be acting consistently, since we equally deny blind humans (for instance) the "right" to drive because this would harm others (apart from themselves).

But just as we accord and recognize the right to life and the right not to be treated as property to all sentient humans (irrespective of IQ levels, etc), there is no non-speciesist way of denying the same rights to also sentient non-human animals.

Addendum:

Since the condition called Trisomy 13 is mentioned in Mr Azzopardi's letter (which I reporduced in full) on which I commented and led the arguments for the rights of persons to the recognition of animal rights, a google alert on the term "trisomy" has brought up this blog entry.

I have been alerted to this by Therese Ann from a Trisomy 13 support organization. It is only fair to reproduce her email here, as well as sending her the link she requested.

Therese Ann wrote:

"Your blog came to me under google alerts for trisomy 13 '...and trisomy 13, which has a 28 per cent rate. Both conditions are accompanied by severe retardation, limb and organ deformities and a general inability to see, hear or smell'.

I'd love to have the actual link to the article you cite here....These children have many abnormalities but are a delight and joy to their families. They are a bit of work compared to the typical child but they are beautiful souls... Many more would survive if some parents did push for medical intervention. Some opt to just hold their child due to the many complications, and or some just don't want to abort and yet don't want a difficult future ahead of them so palliative and comfort care is their choice.

Sadly though, we still have many families who are only offered termination and induction when they are given the prenatal diagnosis. For those families who don't find us, and the hope this site provides, it is very sad. For those that do find the site, can create memories with their loved one, whether it is an hour, day or months.

To see many living kids with trisomy 13, visit http://www.livingwithtrisomy13.org and be sure to view our living and treasured memory album pages.

Blessings,

ThereseAnn"

Needless to say, reproducing the email and sharing the link to the Trisomy 13 site does not necessarily mean that I agree with everything stated on that website. That said, this does not necessarily mean that I oppose any or all that is provided on the site. People are encouraged to visit the site (if they so wish) and form their own opinions.